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Abstract Delivery in water markets is generally operated by agencies through channel systems, which
imposes physical and institutional market constraints. Many water markets allow water users to post selling
and buying requests on a board. However, water users may not be able to choose efﬁciently when the
information (including the constraints) becomes complex. This study proposes an innovative two-phase
model to address this problem based on practical experience in China. The ﬁrst phase seeks and determines
the optimal assignment that maximizes the incremental improvement of the system’s social welfare
according to the bids and asks in the water market. The second phase sets appropriate prices under
constraints. Applying this model to China’s Xiying Irrigation District shows that it can improve social welfare
more than the current ‘‘pool exchange’’ method can. Within the second phase, we evaluate three objective
functions (minimum variance, threshold-based balance, and two-sided balance), which represent different
managerial goals. The threshold-based balance function should be preferred by most users, while the
two-sided balance should be preferred by players who post extreme prices.
1. Introduction
Water markets are being increasingly adopted as a reallocation tool as water scarcity intensiﬁes (Wheeler
et al., 2014). Since their successful development in the United States and Australia, water markets have
been widely employed by private individuals and governments all around the world, such as in Chile (Bauer,
2004), South Africa (Nieuwoudt & Armitage, 2004), England (Lumbroso et al., 2014), and China (Zheng et al.,
2011). A water market is a marketplace where buyers and sellers can trade. A board is often provided to
receive bids, offer information, and facilitate legal water rights transfers. Water markets are expected to gen-
erate economic gains by reallocating water from lower valued to higher valued uses (Hearne & Easter,
1995). Many studies have examined the economic gains that water markets produce (Horbulyk & Lo, 1998).
Water markets are generally operated for permanent or temporary water rights transfers, such as in Austra-
lia and China (Grafton & Horne, 2014; Wheeler et al., 2014; Xu et al., 2016). In temporary water rights trading,
the more common kind (Bjornlund, 2003), a lease for a volume of allocated water is provided for only one
season or year. Permanent water rights trading involves the sale or transfer of a part or all of a water entitle-
ment. Both types of trade require trading systems, within which economic and biophysical factors must be
considered (Zaman et al., 2009).
In the United States, a water market is also referred to as ‘‘water banking,’’ broadly deﬁned as ‘‘an institu-
tional mechanism that facilitates the legal transfer and market exchange of various types of surface, ground-
water, and storage entitlement’’ (Clifford et al., 2004). Water banks serve as broker, clearinghouse, and
market-maker. Brokers connect or solicit buyers and sellers to create sales. A clearinghouse serves mainly as
a repository for bid and offer information. A market-maker attempts to ensure that quantities supplied and
demanded in the market are equal. Water banks can also offer administrative and technical functions, such
as determining bankable rights, qualifying traders, setting contract terms and/or prices, and facilitating reg-
ulatory requirements (Clifford et al., 2004). The level of a bank’s involvement in market trades can differ
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greatly depending on the type of market, pricing rules, and contract structures. However, each water bank
is operated by an administrative agency responsible for supervising transactions and establishing banking
rules and services.
The water market structure determines how participants interact and engage in transactions. Price and mar-
ket information are deemed essential to the development of water markets and water banks. Without ade-
quate price and market information, buyers and sellers would have difﬁculty locating trading partners and
accessing price signals. Buyers and sellers can incur signiﬁcant expenses in identifying trading partners.
Once a trading partner is identiﬁed, the information required to negotiate a transaction price effectively is
typically limited. Consequently, the design and structure of market participants’ interactions can have a sig-
niﬁcant inﬂuence on trading activity and overall market or bank success. Several types of market structure
are commonly used, the ﬁrst of which is decentralized. In decentralized markets, sellers and buyers ﬁnd
each other and negotiate a price without the help of a broker. Searching and bargaining costs can be high
in such markets (Lumbroso et al., 2014). Buyers and sellers share information by posting their buy and sell
bids on bulletin boards, which are often literal bulletin boards maintained by an irrigation or water manage-
ment district. Prices are determined by the market through repeated interactions between buyers and sell-
ers. In this system, price dispersion can occur in thinly traded markets, and transaction costs may preclude
other means of market regulation (Clifford et al., 2004). In the second type, a centralized market, the water
market allocates trades according to the willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) of indi-
viduals (Murphy et al., 2000). Centralized markets are often operated as a pool trading system (Lumbroso
et al., 2014), an important market structure that usually employs a double auction mechanism, in a so-called
‘‘smart market’’ approach. For instance, in the sealed bid double auction mechanism, the market operator
ﬁrst ranks the offers to sell and offers to buy by price; bids are then matched to establish the clearing price,
set at a level that allows the maximum volume of water to be sold. No water bank in the United States uti-
lizes double auctions, but this format has been implemented with varying degrees of success in water mar-
kets of Australia and China (Clifford et al., 2004; Lumbroso et al., 2014; Tisdell, 2011; Xu et al., 2016).
The key difﬁculty of applying the double auction mechanism, or smart market approach, is matching sellers
with buyers in the pool while simultaneously setting the prices under physical and institutional constraints.
A typical case of physical constraints is the Greater-Goulburn water market in Australia. Higher prices in
temporary water trading reﬂect a price premium in the Greater-Goulburn due to spatial limits on trade
imposed by the infrastructure bottleneck at the ‘‘Barmah Choke’’ (Brennan, 2006). A typical case of institu-
tional constraints on water trade is in Australia’s state of Victoria, which limits the volume of net outbound
entitlement trade from an irrigation district to a maximum of 4% of the total volume of water entitlement
held in each district. Victoria’s 4% rule has prevented some water trade in four out of nine irrigation areas
within the state for high-reliability water entitlements and in one out of eight irrigation areas for low-
reliability entitlements (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 2013). In Australia and China,
where the double auction water markets are usually applied, these constraints have not been explicitly
engaged when operating the double auction water markets. Thus, the matched trades and set prices do
not always satisfy the constraints. Some efﬁciency-enhancing trades are prevented, and prices are set inap-
propriately because of a lack of decision-support tools that could incorporate the physical and institutional
constraints associated with water trading (Brooks & Harris, 2008; Zaman et al., 2009).
This creates a need for the ability to optimize trade matching and price setting in double auction water mar-
kets with physical and institutional constraints (Erfani et al., 2014; Zaman et al., 2009). Despite efforts to
remove these constraints or mitigate their impacts (Grafton & Horne, 2014; Turral et al., 2005), a technical
tool is still needed to assist the operation of these double auction water markets. After all, entirely removing
these constraints is difﬁcult and costly while improving the performance of existing water markets is imper-
ative. Thus, this study proposes a two-phase model that identiﬁes efﬁcient trade matching and price setting
in a double auction water market, incorporating physical constraints (e.g., hydrological and engineering
constraints such as channel connectivity and capacity), institutional constraints (e.g., trading constraints set
by facilitators to account for delivery costs or environmental purposes), and economic factors. Such a model
can help determine the optimal market-clearing scheme for a double auction water market with
constraints.
The proposed method is simulated using actual water trading data from the Xiying Irrigation District (XID),
Shiyang River Basin, China. An online trading system has been used in the Shiyang River Basin for actual
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water market management since 2013; a ‘‘pool exchange’’ method is used for trade matching and price set-
ting based on the experience of the Australian water market. This trading system runs like a sealed double
auction mechanism in a water bank, as mentioned by Clifford et al. (2004). The pool exchange selects a
unique price for all the trades according to their bids. At this price, the total volume of water sellers seek to
sell is equal to the total volume of water buyers seek to buy. Theoretically, the pool exchange can maximize
social welfare (i.e., total economic beneﬁts of the water market system) in fully connected markets, meaning
that a seller can sell water to any buyer with no physical or institutional constraints. The pool exchange
ranks sellers according to their asking price (from lowest to highest) and ranks buyers according to their
bids (from highest to lowest). Thereafter, the sellers and buyers are matched in order until the asking price
of the current seller is no lower than the bid of the current buyer. Because constraints are not considered,
this simple pool exchange method signiﬁcantly reduces the efﬁciency and effectiveness of the XID’s water
market (Xu et al., 2016). A simple demonstration is given in Appendix A to illustrate why the pool exchange
method cannot always achieve optimal assignments.
Based on the practical experience of the XID’s water market, this study introduces a new method of improv-
ing the trading system by developing an innovative two-phase model for trade matching and price setting
that considers physical and institutional constraints and economic motivations of water users. The ﬁrst
phase of the model obtains the trade assignment that maximizes incremental social welfare gained from
trading, through a linear programming model. The second phase determines a price portfolio for the opti-
mal assignments that can achieve equity or some other managerial purpose. The price portfolio assigns dif-
ferent prices for different users to maximize the incremental improvement in social welfare (Budish, 2011).
This two-phase model is applied to the XID to examine its effectiveness and efﬁciency. Different objective
functions are used to select the price portfolio, representing different managerial purposes. The resulting
price portfolios are then discussed in terms of users’ and managers’ preferences.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, the two-phase model is developed. Then, XID, the
case area, is introduced. The effectiveness of the model and outcomes of the three objective functions are
then analyzed and discussed, followed by conclusions.
2. Two-Phase Model
In the XID, the buyers and sellers are villages. A village can be either a seller or a buyer in each round (every
2 months) but cannot be both. A village can be a buyer in one round and a seller in another. A two-phase
model is presented to solve the trade-matching and price-setting problems. The ﬁrst phase uses a linear
programming model to maximize the incremental social welfare gained from trading, based on the asks,
and bids of sellers and buyers, respectively. Optimal trade assignments from the model are recorded as a
list of tuples, (s, b, v), such that seller s sells water to buyer b at volume v. The model’s second phase sets the
price for each trade. Given these prices, the optimal choice of each user follows the trade assignments
determined by the ﬁrst phase precisely. The second phase is another programming model, in which the
objective function can be deﬁned three different ways depending on the managerial purpose. In a fully con-
nected water market, the output of the two-phase model will be the same as that of a pool exchange. The
two-phase model can thus be viewed as an extension of the pool exchange, which may improve the perfor-
mance of double auction water markets with constraints.
2.1. First-Phase Model: Trade-Matching
A water market is deﬁned as a bipartite graph G5ðS; B; EÞ. S5fs1; s2; . . . ; snðSÞg denotes the set of sellers.
The number of sellers is n(S). Each seller si needs to report their minimum acceptable price psi and the maxi-
mum volume for sale qsi . Thus, si will never sell water at a price lower than psi , and the total volume they
sell will never exceed qsi . Correspondingly, B5fb1; b2; . . . ; bnðBÞg denotes the set of buyers. The number of
buyers is n(B). Each buyer bi needs to report their maximum acceptable price pbi and the maximum volume
to buy qbi . Thus, bi will never buy water at a price higher than pbi , and the total volume they buy will never
exceed qbi .
In graph theory, the term ‘‘edges’’ refers to connections between nodes. In water markets, each water user
can be denoted by a node, and an edge between any two users occurs if water delivery between them is
both physically (i.e., linked by canals) and institutionally (i.e., allowed by agencies) feasible. E5feijjðsi; bjÞ51g
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denotes the set of edges between sellers and buyers. For seller si and buyer bj, ðsi; bjÞ51 means that the fol-
lowing two conditions are satisﬁed:
1. The minimum acceptable price for the seller (psi ) is smaller than the maximum acceptable price for the
buyer (pbj ).
2. The trade between si and bj is acceptable. In other words, the traders (si and bj) are in a feasible trading
range, and their trade has no barriers (i.e., the edges generated comply with all physical and institutional
constraints of the water market system).
A trade assignment f is mapped from an edge to the assigned trading volume on it, which reﬂects the trad-
ing volume between a seller and a buyer. The volume on edge eij is denoted by qij. A feasible trade assign-
ment satisﬁes the following two requirements:
1. For each seller si, the total volume on the edges outgoing from si is smaller than or equal to si’s maximum
volume qsi . Formally,
8i51; 2; . . . ; nðSÞ;
X
i;j s:t: eij2E
qij  qsi : (1)
2. Similarly, for each buyer bi, the total volume on the edges attached to bi is smaller than or equal to bi’s
maximum volume qbi . Formally,
8j51; 2; . . . ; nðBÞ;
X
i;j s:t: eij2E
qij  qbj : (2)
Each edge with a positive volume has a price at which the seller and buyer conduct the trade. For edge eij,
we let pij denote the price for each unit of water. When seller si sells qij units of water to buyer bj at price pij,
si gains qijðpij2psi Þ proﬁt, and bj gains qijðpbj2pijÞ proﬁt. The set of prices for all edges is deﬁned as a ‘‘price
proﬁle,’’ which represents the price structure of one round of trading in the market.
The total proﬁt of seller si (i.e., producer surplus) is derived by summing, as follows:
uðsiÞ5
X
i;j s:t: eij2E
qijðpij2psi Þ: (3)
The total proﬁt of buyer bj (i.e., consumer surplus) is derived as follows:
uðbjÞ5
X
i;j s:t: eij2E
qijðpbj2pijÞ: (4)
Maximizing incremental social welfare is desirable in market design problems. Incremental social welfare is
typically deﬁned as the total trading proﬁts (i.e., total surplus) of all users in the market. Formally, incremen-
tal social welfare, SW, is deﬁned as follows:
SW5
XnðSÞ
i51
uðsiÞ1
XnðBÞ
j51
uðbjÞ
5
X
eij2E
qijðpij2psi Þ1
X
eij2E
qijðpbj2pijÞ
5
X
eij2E
ðqijðpbj2pijÞ1qijðpij2psi ÞÞ
5
X
eij2E
qijðpbj2psi Þ:
(5)
In water rights markets, water resources are allocated efﬁciently if the incremental social welfare is maxi-
mized. This problem can be solved through a linear programming model that maximizes SW by choosing
the volumes qij  0, for all eij 2 E subject to equations (1) and (2).
To summarize, the linear programming model for the ﬁrst phase can be written as follows:
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Maximize :
X
eij2E
qijðpbj2psi Þ (6)
s:t: :
X
i;j s:t: eij2E
qij  qsi ; for all i51; 2; . . . ; nðSÞ (7)
X
i;j s:t: eij2E
qij  qbj ; for all j51; 2; . . . ; nðBÞ (8)
qij  0; for all eij 2 E; (9)
where si is the ith seller, bj is the jth buyer, eij is the edge between si and bj, qij is the volume traded on eij
(They are the only variables in the linear program), psi is the ask of seller si, pbj is the bid of buyer bj, qsi , or
qbj is the maximum volume to trade for seller si or buyer bj. Objective function (6) maximizes incremental
social welfare. Equations (7) and (8) indicate that neither buyers nor sellers will trade more than they need.
Equation (9) guarantees that the volume on any edge is nonnegative.
2.2. Second-Phase Model: Price-Setting
In the second phase, the optimal assignment from the ﬁrst phase is ﬁxed as a hard constraint. Subject to
this assignment, the second phase calculates the optimal price proﬁles for various managerial purposes.
2.2.1. Price-Setting Constraints
A linear program is employed in the second phase to determine optimal prices in a double auction water
market. Threshold price is an important concept in this optimization problem. When the trading prices of all
edges are given, each buyer, according to their maximum quantity demanded, can ﬁnd a price tbj that satis-
ﬁes the following criteria: (1) all feasible trades with lower prices are preferred and accepted; and (2) all fea-
sible trades with higher prices can be rejected. This price is deﬁned as the threshold price of the buyer. This
threshold price is determined by the edge-based supply-demand relationship of the buyer. Two cases are
possible: (1) the buyer’s maximum quantity demanded can be met at a lower-than-bidding threshold price;
or (2) the buyer’s maximum quantity demanded cannot be met even if all available water under the bidding
price has been bought. For case 1, the threshold price helps the buyer decide which sellers to choose. For
case 2, the threshold price is the same as the bidding price. Put simply, the threshold price measures the
highest price that the buyer would like to accept when an edge-based supply-demand relationship is given.
The deﬁnition is similar for a seller.
In the second-phase model, the prices for all edges attached to buyer bj are presented and known to the
buyer. Simultaneously, buyer bj also knows they cannot buy more than qsi units of water from seller si. For
any edge eij, if price pij is smaller than the buyer’s bidding price pbj , then eij is acceptable to bj. The optimal
strategy for bj, thus, satisﬁes the following constraints:
1. Buyer bj wants to buy as much water as possible from acceptable edges subject to the maximum volume
constraints of bj and the sellers.
2. Price threshold tbj exists such that, if the price on edge eij is lower than tbj , then bj would like to buy
as much water as possible from si. If the price is higher than tbj , then bj will not buy water from si. And if the
price is exactly equal to tbj , then bj may buy some water from si, in an amount subject to the volume of bj.
The ﬁrst condition should hold in theory because any trade on acceptable edges can increase the proﬁt for
bj. By contradiction, the second constraint should also hold: if bj buys water from high and low-price sellers,
then a better strategy for bj is to buy as much water from the low-price seller as possible. The optimal strat-
egy for seller si follows a similar logic and satisﬁes two similar constraints.
In the second-phase model, the price thresholds for all sellers and buyers are treated as variables, for which
the model solves. And because we expect pij to fall somewhere between tsi and tbj , the prices on all edges
are also variables. The optimal trade assignment volume qij is a constant, the value of which is determined
by the ﬁrst-phase model. The second-phase model’s objective function is temporarily left arbitrary and will
be speciﬁed later to represent various management purposes. The second-phase programming model for
price setting is thus deﬁned as follows:
Minimize : Arbitrary (10)
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s:t: : pij  tsi ; 8eij 2 E; qij > 0 (11)
pij  tbi ; 8eij 2 E; qij > 0 (12)
pij  tsi ; 8eij 2 E; qij < minðqsi ; qbj Þ (13)
pij  tbi ; 8eij 2 E; qij < minðqsi ; qbj Þ (14)
tsi5psi ; 8si 2 S;
X
eij2E
qij < qsi (15)
tbj5pbj ; 8bj 2 B;
X
eij2E
qij < qbj : (16)
The solution to this model speciﬁes the threshold prices for all sellers and buyers. For each edge with a pos-
itive volume in the optimal trade assignment, the threshold prices are guaranteed by equations (11) and
(12), ensuring that all players seek to trade on these edges.
These edges can be divided into two types. The ﬁrst type comprises edges for which the volumes are equal
to the maximum volume of the seller or buyer; the second type comprises all other edges. For the second
type edge eij, seller’s price threshold tsi should be exactly same as buyer’s price threshold tbj . Their thresh-
olds are also equal to the price pij on this edge. If pij is higher than tbj , bj will reject the trade. If pij is lower
than tsi , the seller will reject the trade. If seller’s threshold tsi is higher than buyer’s tbj , either the buyer or
seller will trade less with someone else and trade more on this edge until they reach the buyer’s or seller’s
maximum volume. Given the assigned prices (generated by the linear program), a player’s optimal strategy
is to follow their assigned volume. This strategy indicates that the ﬁrst edge type is preferred over the sec-
ond, and the second type is the marginal case. These two types of edges are preferred over those with zero
volume in the solution.
Moreover, the optimal prices pij are set to ensure that players’ threshold prices cannot be reached by equa-
tions (13) or (14). In a special case for edge eij, if minðqsi ; qbj Þ > qij > 0, equations (11) and (12) can be
applied to this edge; thus, pij5tsi5tbj . For the edges satisfying both qij> 0 and qij < minðqsi ; qbj Þ, equations
(11) and (13) imply that they need to satisfy both constraints, resulting in pij5tsi . Equations (12) and (14)
have similar implications. Meanwhile, equations (15) and (16) are for those whose volumes are not fulﬁlled.
If a seller or buyer still has volume for trading, they will accept any price that is higher than their ask price
or lower than their bid price; thus, their threshold prices are identical to their bids or asks.
2.2.2. Options for the Objective Function
Two objectives commonly guide water market management: price stabilization and equity. Price stabiliza-
tion is often viewed as the most important objective because a clear and consistent price signal to traders
can be used to adjust their future bids and asks. In a water market, however, a single and stable price is not
always achievable. One reason is that many water markets are not fully connected (i.e., they suffer physical
or institutional constraints), making it sometimes impossible to set a unique market price while simulta-
neously ensuring maximum social welfare. Another reason a single and stable price might not be achiev-
able is the inherent intertemporal variability of water resources. In the Murray-Darling River Basin of
Australia, for example, average water allocations were very low during the severest years of the drought
(from 2006 to 2008), which coincided with a peak in water prices, while water prices fell sharply in 2010 and
2011 as water availability greatly increased with the end of the Millennium Drought (Grafton & Horne,
2014).
Equity can also be a concern and thus a management objective in some markets. Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
showed that fairness motives affected the behavior of many people in markets. McKay and Bjornlund
(2001) found that larger ‘‘water-rich’’ farms are thought to be more powerful and resilient than smaller
‘‘water-poor’’ ones in water markets. They argued that this divide polarized the irrigation community and
could lead to conﬂict. To reﬂect these different managerial objectives, appropriate objective functions are
deﬁned in the price-setting model, resulting in different optimal price proﬁles.
2.2.2.1. Minimum Variance
To achieve price stabilization, we deﬁne an objective function that selects the price proﬁle with the mini-
mum price variance. First, we deﬁne a volume-weighted price as follows.
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p5
X
eij2EqijpijX
eij2Eqij
: (17)
Then, we deﬁne the minimum variance objective function as follows.
X
eij2E
ðpij2pÞ2: (18)
2.2.2.2. Two-Sided Balance
A simple way to achieve equity is to set the price pij on each edge at the midpoint of the seller’s ask and
the buyer’s bid. This fairness can be extended to the entire market, such that the total surplus of sellers is as
close as possible to the total surplus of buyers. The objective function in this situation can be deﬁned as the
square value of the difference between total proﬁts of all sellers and all buyers. The squared differences are
then weighted by the trading volumes on the edges. Thus, the objective function is deﬁned as follows.
X
eij2E
qijððpbj2pijÞ2ðpij2psi ÞÞ2 (19)
5
X
eij2E
qijðpsi1pbj22pijÞ2: (20)
2.2.2.3. Threshold-Based Balance
Another way to achieve equity is to set prices according to supply-demand relationships in the water mar-
ket, which can be related to threshold prices. Recall that threshold prices reﬂect edge-based supply-demand
relationships. Those with a larger number of tradable edges probably have better threshold prices because
more deal options are available, thus achieving higher proﬁts from unit trading. Conversely, those with
fewer tradable edges probably have less desirable threshold prices, thus achieving lower proﬁts from unit
trading. Setting the price pij at the midpoint of a seller’s and buyer’s threshold prices on an individual edge
is a simple but natural idea, when the edge-based supply-demand relationships are given. This objective
function can be written as follows.
X
eij2E
qijððtbj2pijÞ2ðpij2tsi ÞÞ2 (21)
5
X
eij2E
qijðtbj1tsi22pijÞ2: (22)
As with many other water market methods (e.g., pool exchange), traders can earn more in the proposed
two-phase market through manipulation. For example, traders can learn from the trading price history and
decide strategically to submit higher or lower prices in the next period. However, the effect of manipulation
can also create tradeoffs for traders. For a seller, asking a higher price will likely lead to a smaller trading vol-
ume, whereas asking a lower price will result in a lower surplus for each unit. This situation is similar for a
buyer. This tradeoff helps constrain the traders’ asks and bids within a rational range, ultimately leading to
truthful bid revelation and price stabilization. In some cases, traders may initially be unaware of the water’s
value, but they tend to gain accuracy in their bids through their trading experience. The water market in
the studied area has been operating for several years, and prices have become more stable over the last 2
years (Xu et al., 2016).
3. Case Study Area and Data
3.1. Case Study Background
This study examines the water market in XID, Shiyang River Basin, China. Chinese water resources are
owned by the central government, which has been promoting the establishment of water markets in recent
years (Jiang, 2009; Wang, 2003). Regional and individual water users only have water use rights (Speed,
2009a). Several pilot water markets have been established over the last few years in Hebei and Gansu prov-
inces (Mi et al., 2008; Speed, 2009a, 2009b; Wang et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2008). Water rights in these areas
are similar to those in Australia; they comprise (1) permanent water entitlements that provide an ongoing
share of a consumptive pool in terms of annual mean, and (2) temporary water allocations, which are the
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water volumes assigned to a water entitlement in a given water season within a speciﬁed water availability
(Grafton & Horne, 2014; Zheng et al., 2011). Water entitlements and allocations are all tradable, correspond-
ing to permanent and temporary rights trading, respectively.
Shiyang River Basin is in Gansu Province of northwestern China. The basin covers ﬁve counties with an area
of 41,600 km2 (see Figure 1). Total renewable water resources of the basin are estimated at 1.66 billion m3,
including an annual average surface water resource of 1.56 billion m3 and groundwater resources of 0.10
billion m3 (Xu et al., 2005). Total water withdrawals in the river basin were estimated at 2.80 billion m3 in
2000 (Wang et al., 2009). Water resources have thus been overused, causing serious ecological problems in
the river basin. The population in downstream Minqin County, for example, had to abandon their homes
and livelihoods due to the desertiﬁcation of their land, becoming ecological refugees.
The Water Resource Department and Development and Reform Commission of Gansu Province developed
the Restoration Plan for Shiyang River Basin to address its water problems (Gansu Development and Reform
Commission, 2005). The Restoration Plan was approved by the State Council of China in 2007 and funded
with 4.7 billion RMB (1 RMB5 0.137 USD in 2007). A water rights system was implemented as part of this
plan, wherein water entitlements were initialized to users through water permits from the government
(Wang et al., 2007). Users’ actual water rights (i.e., water allocations) are speciﬁed in each water season
according to their water entitlements and water availability at that time.
The XID is a gravity-fed surface water irrigation area within the Shiyang River Basin (see Figure 1). Average
annual rainfall is approximately 280 mm, and potential evapotranspiration is approximately 1,200 mm. Total
population is approximately 156,000. The cultivated area is 444,900 mu (1 m5 666.67 m2), of which 238,000
are active irrigated areas. Figure 2 shows the canal distribution in the XID, which comprises a main canal,
ﬁve trunk canals, and several branch canals. A total of 70 villages are linked by the branch canals. Xiying
River Reservoir is located upstream of these canals. This reservoir supplies irrigation water to the down-
stream farmers.
In Figure 2, each star represents a village with its corresponding name. Each line represents a canal; the lines
are colored to distinguish between irrigation canal levels. Initial water rights have been entitled to all
Figure 1. Map of the Shiyang River Basin in Gansu Province of northwestern China.
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villages each year since 2008 (this process is described in detail in Xu et al., 2016). According to the water
rights of users in the village and total water availability of the entire basin, a certain water volume is allo-
cated to each village in the district as its annual water-use cap for each year. The leader of the water user
association (WUA) in each village sells or buys water in the market on behalf of the farmers. Each village typ-
ically has one WUA.
Trades in XID are allowed only between villages. In our model, each village is represented as an individual
water user and is considered one player. Two types of water markets are used in XID. The ﬁrst is an ofﬂine
market, in which players report their bids/asks (without speciﬁed trading partners) to the market board
via word-of-mouth or phone, and the market board then matches sellers with buyers. The second type is
an online market (http://www.water-trading.net/) for water users, wherein players report asks/bids to the
website. The online market system can match sellers with buyers according to the information they
report. For both markets, a simple pool exchange method is employed for trade matching and price set-
ting. Currently, XID’s trading authority checks the applicant’s water availability, the canal’s condition, and
the price of their bid before approving their trade. Such casual pool-exchange matching methods may
result in suboptimal social welfare, particularly given physical constraints in the canal system. Thus, a
globally optimized model with a pricing rule and equity-based objective function may increase social
welfare.
XID’s ofﬁcial water trading website, built in 2012, provides an online market place for water trading and pro-
motes water trading development. Villages can submit their asks or bids and corresponding trading vol-
umes to the website. The website matches sellers to buyers according to their reports and locations.
Typically, trades between neighboring villages are preferred (Xu et al., 2016), which the market takes into
consideration when allocating the trades.
Figure 2. Locations of the villages; the arrows show ﬂow directions on the trunk canal and main canals.
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The total surface water trading volumes for 2013, 2014, and 2015 were 4.58, 5.96, and 8.15 million m3, respec-
tively. The total ground water trading volumes were 0.05, 0.41, and 1.28 million m3, respectively. With the
development of the market, casual matching may produce greater welfare loss. Thus, a globally optimized
model with a pricing rule and a fairness consideration is urgently needed. Our analyses are based on the trad-
ing records of XID’s water rights market. A total of 349 records exist for 73 water users (i.e., villages). For each
year from 2008 to 2014, a total of 55, 47, 50, 31, 68, 41, and 57 records were available, respectively (for details,
see Xu et al., 2016). Each record provides data on the seller, buyer, volume, trading price, and date.
3.2. Data Sampling
In the online trading system, the original bids and asks were unfortunately not recorded due to historical
reasons beyond our control. We therefore, assume that the maximum/minimum acceptable prices and vol-
ume of each player are normally distributed around the trading prices, based on which synthetic bids and
asks are generated to test the two-phase model.
For any player (seller or buyer), the trading records ðp1i ; q1i Þ; ðp2i ; q2i Þ; . . . ; ðpTi ; qTi Þ are given. pti denotes the
price for the tth trading of the player, and qti denotes the corresponding volume. We let lpi and rpi denote
the expectation and standard deviation of p1i ; p
2
i ; . . . ; p
T
i . We let lqi and rqi denote the expectation and
standard deviation of q1i ; q
2
i ; . . . ; q
T
i .
The variance of bids and asks in the sampling scheme is estimated based on the variance in the historical mar-
ket price records. The sampled volumes are q0i  Nðlqi ;r2ðqiÞÞ, in a simple Gaussian distribution. Given that
the asks from sellers are typically lower than the bids from buyers, the sampled price is generated by the fol-
lowing method. First, we draw a random price from Nðlpi ;r2ðpiÞÞ. For a seller, if the price is between lpi2rpi
and lpi10:5rpi , we set it as the price; otherwise, we regenerate a price and check again. For a buyer, if the
price is between lpi20:5rpi and lpi1rpi , we set it as the price; otherwise, we regenerate a price and check
again. This procedure is based on the assumption that the marginal value product of water is typically higher
for buyers than those for sellers. This sampling procedure should be further examined, however, when original
bids and asks become available. Otherwise, our procedure might misrepresent the historical extent of market
activity, without analyzing the actual trading probability of bids and asks. We leave this to future work.
The number of participants in the market has ﬂuctuated widely during the past few years. So, we set the
participation ratio, or the probability of each player participating in the market, at 0.5—an optimistic
approximation based on 2015 activity. The probability of one player (i.e., one village) being a seller in our
model is equal to the probability of the player being a seller in the historical record. Following these rules,
we generate 100 independent instances with which to evaluate the three objective functions. In the investi-
gated area, water rights are allocated bimonthly. Before each 2 month period, the villages can trade water
rights for those 2 months. Each instance simulates the market for a single 2 month period.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Economic Effects of Canal Connectivity
Figure 3 shows the incremental social welfare (and 95% conﬁdence interval) under the two-phase modeling
approach versus a simpler pool exchange approach under different degrees of canal connectivity. The
results show that, when trades can happen only within a main canal (i.e., the canal gap is 0), the incremental
social welfare for both approaches is low, yet our two-phase approach outperforms pool exchange by
approximately 4,518 RMB. When the maximum canal gap is increased to 1 (i.e., trades can happen between
two neighboring main canals), the difference between the two approaches declines to 1,838 RMB, and the
incremental social welfare for both approaches increases signiﬁcantly. When the maximum canal gap is set
to 3 (i.e., trades can happen between main canals that have up to 2 other main canals between them), virtu-
ally no difference is observed between the two approaches. The incremental social welfare is almost the
same when the canal gap is 3 or 4. If the XID canal system could increase their canal gap to 2, this would be
good enough for either approach to capture nearly all of the potential maximum social welfare.
The effects of two factors—connectivity between canals, and the matching model or approach (i.e., the pro-
posed two-phase model versus simple pool exchange)—on water market performance are as follows. For
both matching approaches, better connectivity between traders can improve incremental social welfare.
When the canal system is fully connected, both approaches can generate socially optimal trade
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assignments. The proposed two-phase model achieves better incremental social welfare than pool-
exchange when the canal system is not fully connected. The incremental social welfare generated by the
two approaches become more similar as connectivity increases. Figure 3 shows that the marginal beneﬁt of
expending canal connectivity is thus positive but diminishing (see Supporting Information S1 for plot data),
implying that an appropriate degree of canal connectivity should be selected by comparing the marginal
value to the corresponding marginal costs.
Figure 3. Incremental social welfare comparison between a pool exchange model and the proposed two-phase model.
Figure 4. Percentage improvement in social welfare when the proposed two-phase modeling approach is used compared
to pool exchange (with 95% conﬁdence interval). A maximum tradable canal gap of 0 means no trade is possible between
main canals; a gap of 4 means trade is allowed between all main canals.
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Figure 4 shows the percent improvement in social welfare achieved
(and 95% conﬁdence interval) using the proposed two-phase
method rather than pool exchange, which conﬁrms that the percent-
age improvement is greater with a smaller tradable canal gap
(i.e., when connectivity is more constrained). When the canal gap is
0, the improvement from replacing the simple pool exchange
method with the two-phase modeling approach is 19.51% (45185
27678223160; 4518=23160519:51%), which is a signiﬁcant improve-
ment for the market. Although the beneﬁt of applying the two-phase
approach becomes less signiﬁcant as canal connectivity increases, it is
still important when the canal is not well-connected in an irrigation dis-
trict. This situation is common among developing countries with undeveloped infrastructure and little opera-
tional experience.
When the maximum tradable canal gap is 0, it is instructive to compare our two-phase approach to running
the pool exchange method individually on each main canal. This method is deﬁned as ‘‘separate pool
exchange.’’ When the two-phase model is run separately on each main canal with a minimum variance
objective, it yields the same results as does the separate pool exchange method, as shown in Table 1. A per-
formance comparison between the proposed two-phase method and separate pool exchange (along with a
95% conﬁdence interval) is shown in Figure 5 for the whole canal system. When the maximum tradable
canal gap is greater than 0, the social welfare from the two-phased model is signiﬁcantly greater, implying
that the proposed model is more generic and ﬂexible than is the separate pool exchange method, speciﬁ-
cally when trading linkages are complex.
4.2. Trade Price Distribution
The three different objective functions generally yield different price proﬁles, which are summarized as fre-
quency histograms in Figure 6 (see Supporting Information S1 for plot data). By deﬁnition, the ‘‘minimum
variance’’ objective function achieves the most balanced price histogram in any single trial. To construct the
frequency histograms for a given objective function’s price proﬁle, the prices on all edges for all 100 instan-
ces (even without a trade) are counted. The number of edges in those 100 instances total 8,472. Given this
substantial amount, the price histograms are stable. The histograms each peak around a trade price, pij, of
0.18 RMB, which indicates that the prices on approximately 3,000 edges (out of 8,472) are around 0.18 RMB.
These results verify that setting a unique price in the market while simultaneously ensuring maximum social
welfare is not always achievable in a water market with physical and institutional constraints. However, the
Table 1
Social Welfare (RMB) Comparison Between Three Market Management Methods
Canal gap
Two-phase
model
Pool
exchange
Separate pool
exchange
0 27,678.21 23,160.44 27,678.21
1 35,210.63 33,372.09 27,678.21
2 37,113.94 36,911.79 27,678.21
3 37,359.70 37,357.10 27,678.21
4 37,366.96 37,366.96 27,678.21
Figure 5. Percentage improvement compared to separate pool exchange with 95% conﬁdence interval.
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minimum variance objective function can send more concentrated price signals to traders and might, there-
fore, be considered by some to be the most important managerial objective. With this objective, more con-
sistent prices across trades may emerge in the water market. This is especially likely to happen in XID since
the trading partners are in the same region and are thus, likely to have similar socio-economic
characteristics.
4.3. Profits of Players Under Different Objective Functions
In a market, sellers and buyers typically want to maximize their proﬁts. Compared to the pool exchange,
more trades can be matched (see details of an instance in Appendix B), and total social welfare of the mar-
ket can be maximized by applying the proposed two-phase model. Thus, the mean proﬁt of traders is
increased, which implies that most traders would support the proposed method. However, the three objec-
tives in our two-phase model lead to different proﬁt allocations among traders. Some players could beneﬁt
from particular objective functions because of the price distribution and trade structure. To explore this pos-
sibility, we study compare the proﬁts for each player with the three objective functions to identify their pref-
erences. It is difﬁcult to quantitatively measure the magnitude of a player’s preference for a rule. Ranking
the rules is a simple but straightforward way to represent the players’ preferences.
The study area has a total of 73 players (i.e., villages). The expected proﬁt for each player is the average of
the proﬁt made over 100 trials. Player preferences in the three cases can be ranked according to their proﬁts
under the corresponding objectives, as shown in Table 2. We determine that 39 players would, based on
our assumed proﬁt-driven criterion, rank the threshold-based balance
ﬁrst, 20 would rank it second, and only 14 would rank it third. The
‘‘minimum variance’’ case is slightly less preferred: 19 players would
rank it ﬁrst, 39 rank it second, and 15 would rank it third. The two-
sided balance case is the least preferred objective function, with 44
players ranking it third. A statistical test is conducted on these results.
For any two objective functions f1 and f2, assume that n1 people
achieve higher revenue with f1 and n2 achieve higher revenue with f2.
Then, the ratio between n1 and n2, denoted as Rðf1; f2Þ, is computed
for analysis. We show that the 95% conﬁdence interval of Rðthreshold
Figure 6. Frequency histograms of trade prices, pij, under the three objective functions within the two-phase model.
Table 2
Ranking of the Three Objective Functions, Used Within the Two-Phase Model,
According to the Proﬁts of Players
Rank\case
Threshold-based
balance
Two-sided
balance
Minimum
variance
1 39 15 19
2 20 14 39
3 14 44 15
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balance; min varianceÞ is ½1:00; 1:03 with a p value of 0.068, implying that more traders would choose the
threshold-based balance objective function than the minimum variance function. The 95% conﬁdence inter-
val of Rðthreshold balance; two2sided balanceÞ is ½1:00; 1:02 with a p value of 0.23, and that of Rðmin varian
ce; two2sided balanceÞ is ½0:97; 1:01 with a p value of 0.99. These results indicate that the threshold-based
Figure 7. Seller preferences for three different objective functions within the two-phase model.
Figure 8. Buyer preferences for three different objective functions within the two-phase model.
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balance is the players’ preferred objective function while their preferences for the minimum variance and
two-sided balance functions are not signiﬁcantly different.
4.4. Relationship Between Preferences and Ask/Bid Prices
Figure 7 shows the preferences of our modeled sellers for the three objective functions (see Supporting
Information S1 for plot data), based on which function generates the most proﬁt for them. For each seller in
each of the 100 instances, if their ask is p and the preferred objective function is f (e.g., ‘‘minimum vari-
ance’’), then the height of the bar in Figure 7 for objective f at p is increased by 1 unit. If two or three objec-
tive functions generate the same proﬁt for a seller, then they are equally preferred, they share the count 1
(divide the count 1 equally for each preferred object function). Figure 7 shows, once again, that the
threshold-based balance is preferred by most sellers in most cases. The preference pattern for ‘‘minimum
variance’’ across different ask prices is similar to that of threshold-based balance; however, minimum vari-
ance is less preferred. The two-sided balance objective function is preferred by the players with higher asks
(of 0.18 or 0.19 RMB). Given that the two-sided balance tries to achieve the midpoint between the posted
prices of sellers and buyers, more beneﬁts accrue to sellers with relatively high asks.
Figure 8 shows the buyers’ preferences (see Supporting Information S1 for plot data), which are plotted in a
manner similar to Figure 7. Buyers prefer the threshold-based balance in most cases. ‘‘Minimum variance’’ is
generally preferred by buyers with higher bids. By contrast, buyers with lower bids prefer the two-sided bal-
ance because more surplus is likely to be assigned to them to achieve greater equality. We can thus con-
clude that sellers and buyers who post relatively high or low prices prefer the two-sided balance. However,
the threshold-based balance is the most widely-preferred objective function.
5. Conclusion
In this study, we propose a two-phase model for double auction water markets constrained by physical
and institutional conditions, which exist currently in Australia and China. In the model, the ﬁrst phase
identiﬁes optimal trade matches to maximize incremental social welfare. Based on the optimal assign-
ment determined in the ﬁrst phase, the second phase identiﬁes optimal prices for trades based on three
different objective functions serving different management purposes. Three objective functions are
Figure 9. Example of the inefﬁciency of pooled exchange.
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deﬁned, then used to derive optimal assignments, and ﬁnally compared according to various perfor-
mance measures.
The results of a case study in China’s XID show that the threshold-based balance objective function should
theoretically be preferred overall, based on proﬁt motives. The advantage of a ‘‘minimize variance’’ objective
function is that prices for trades among different pairs of players are similar, thus providing stable price sig-
nals to traders. We then compared the proposed two-phase modeling approach to a pool exchange cur-
rently being used. The pool exchange approach causes social welfare losses, particularly in a market where
physical and institutional constraints are binding. In contrast, the proposed two-phase modeling approach
can increase social welfare for constrained water markets. For either market approach, expanding the trad-
able range by relaxing physical and institutional constraints increases social welfare; however, its marginal
Figure 10. Trading assignment for pool exchange for a maximum canal distance of 0.
Figure 11. Optimal (i.e., two-phase) trading assignment for a maximum canal distance of 0.
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value is diminishing. Thus, the degree to which a canal system’s tradable range should be determined by
comparing the marginal beneﬁt to the marginal cost.
The proposed two-phase model can be extended to similar water markets, even those with more traders,
contingent on a detailed survey of the connectivity between the users. Some unique costs of implementing
the proposed model are related to investigating the locations of traders, the linkages among traders, and
institutional constraints on trading. All these factors determine if a feasible edge exist between sellers and
buyers. Once the related information is obtained, the two-phase model can be speciﬁed and engaged to
the online trading systems which are used to support double auction trading. The two-phase model can
also be efﬁciently solved by any linear programming solvers (For example, https://developers.google.com/
optimization/lp/glop), providing ﬂexibility and reduce the technical barrier for real world application. Theo-
retically, the proposed model can be applied to any double auction water markets that are either bigger or
Figure 12. Trading assignment for pool exchange for a maximum canal distance of 1.
Figure 13. Optimal (i.e., two-phase) trading assignment for a maximum canal distance of 1.
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smaller than XID. However, the physical and institutional barriers to trade may vary in different water mar-
kets, which implies that speciﬁcation of constraints is needed when applying the model. For future work,
the proposed model will be applied to different real-world water markets in the world with research focus
on the implementation costs, beneﬁt comparison, and social effects, which would help researchers and
managers get more experience on how to improve the water markets by switching the pool exchange to
the proposed two-phase approach in practice.
Appendix A: An Example of Pool Exchange Not Achieving Optimal Trades
An example is shown in Figure 9. Sellers A and B would like to sell 1 unit of water at prices not lower than 1
and 3, respectively. Buyers C and D would like to buy 1 unit of water at prices not higher than 2 and 4,
respectively. If any seller can sell to any buyer, the assignment for pooled exchange coincides with the opti-
mal assignment. The optimal assignment is that A sells to D at price 2.5, and B and C do not trade. In this
way, the incremental social welfare (i.e., the gain from trading) is 3. In the pool exchange method, however,
if the delivery routes from A to D and from B to C are infeasible, the price will be set to a value between 2
and 3. In this case, no one will wish to trade. Thus, the optimal assignment is to set the price between A and
C at 1.5 and the price between B and D at 3.5; both trades can be conducted, resulting in a total incremental
social welfare of 2.
Appendix B: Comparison of an Instance
Figures 10 and 11 show the pooled exchange assignment and two-phase assignment for the same instance,
respectively. Here, the maximum tradable canal gap is deﬁned to represent the range of allowed trading,
measured by the main canals. In numbering the main canals from 1 to 5 in a clockwise direction, a maxi-
mum tradable canal gap of 0 means that only the users within a main canal can trade with each other; a
maximum tradable canal gap of 1 indicates that the users can trade with those in neighboring main canals
(i.e., trades can happen between users in main canals 1 and 2, canals 2 and 3, and so on). This parameter is
used to represent the institutional constraints of the water market. In practice, administrative agencies cost
more to regulate than a more complicated market system, given the costs of information collection, gate
control, and water-volume monitoring. Thus, agencies tend to conﬁne trading to a smaller range to reduce
operational costs, as has happened in the study area. According to its irrigation history, XID performs a
round irrigation scheme, in which different main canals have different irrigation times according to the his-
torical operation rules. This renders trading between main canals impossible (i.e., the maximum tradable
canal gap is 0). The rationale for this round irrigation scheme is that it incurs the least operational costs for
the agencies concerned.
Figure 10 and 11 show the results of the pool exchange method and optimal assignment; the pink lines
indicate conducted trades, where sellers were connected with buyers. The width of the line is proportional
to the trading volume on that edge. Typically, the market prices differ among the main canals. If we set a
unique price for all trades, multiple trades cannot be conducted because the buyers and sellers are all
above or below the price. The differences can be signiﬁcant, as shown by Figures 10 and 11.
Figures 12 and 13 show the pooled exchange assignment and optimal assignment with a canal distance of 1.
This result indicates that villages from neighboring main canals can trade with each other. Thus, more
trades among villages from different main canals are selected in the assignments. These two ﬁgures have
more trades (pink lines) than Figures 10 and 11 have, implying that the market becomes more active for
pooled exchange assignments and two-phase assignments. In Figures 10 and 11, the volume difference
between the two ﬁgures is signiﬁcant, but the difference between Figures 12 and 13 is less so (reduced
from 949 to 129 RMB), indicating that ensuring better connectivity is even more important for the pooled
exchange.
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